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Abstract
In this paper, we present a multi-period trading model by assuming that traders face not
only asymmetric information but also heterogenous prior beliefs, under the requirement that
the insider publicly disclose his stock trades after the fact. We show that there is an equilibrium
in which the irrational insider camouflages his trades with a noise component so that his private
information is revealed slowly and linearly whenever he is overconfident or underconfident.
We also investigate the relationship between the heterogeneous beliefs and the trade intensity
in the presence of trade disclosure, and show that the weights on asymmetric information and
heterogeneous prior beliefs are opposite in sign and they change alternatively in the next period.
Under the requirement of disclosure, the irrational insider trades more aggressively and leads
to smaller market depth. Moreover, the co-existence of “public disclosure requirement” and
“heterogeneous prior beliefs” leads to the fluctuant multi-period expected profits and a larger
total expected trading volume which is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity. More
importantly, even public disclosure may lead to negative profits of the irrational insider’s in
some periods, inside trading remains profitable from the whole trading period.
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geneous prior beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Anybody, who has a casual look at the security or stock markets, would be amazed by the
fluctuation features of financial markets, such as the fluctuation of the trading volume, the price
and the short-term aggressive trading. But these fascinating features have rarely been studied
in theoretical finance, perhaps for the reason that they seem close to the irrational behavior of
traders and can not be explained in the rational expectations. In this paper, we try to study these
fascinating features of the market and address the implications on financial market of irrational
behavior, by developing a trading model to characterize the optimal behavior of an irrational
insider who possesses long-lived private information about the fundamental value of a security
under mandatory disclosure requirements.
In his pioneering and insightful paper, Kyle (1985) introduces a dynamic model of insider trading
where an insider receives only one signal and the fundamental asset value does not change over
time. Through trade, the insider progressively releases his private information to the market as he
exploits his informational advantage. Kyle (1985) also points out that liquidity trading provides
camouflage which conceals informed trading such that the informed trading is swamped by liquidity
trading. Based on Kyle (1985), Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) consider the case of the same
insider under disclosure requirement as mandated by US securities laws. The ex-post disclosure
of the insider’s trades changes the equilibirum strategy of the insider, given that market makers
can infer information from the insider’s previous trade before the next round of trading. Huddart,
Hughes and Levine (2001) find that public disclosure of the insider’s traders nevertheless accelerates
the price discovery process and lowers trading costs by comparison to the case with no disclosure
requirement. Zhang (2004) extends Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) by incorporating the
condition that the monopoly insider is risk-averse, and he finds that under disclosure requirements,
the risk-averse insider is more concerned about the risk of sub-optimally revealing his information
by mandatory disclosure and his private information is revealed slowly. Also, Zhang (2008) analyzes
a dynamic market where outsiders share part of the information about a security with a corporate
insider and update their incomplete information by learning from disclosed insider trades. Recently,
Gong and Liu (2011) study the optimal behaviors of competitive insiders and their influences to
the market under disclosure requirements. All the papers mentioned above have the assumption
that the insider is rational. An interesting question is what the behavior of an irrational insider
behavior under mandatory disclosure requirements.
In the past few years, lots of literatures have studied the behaviors of irrational traders and
their influences to the market. Odean (1998) presents three different markets structures, two of
which examine price-taking overconfident informed traders, and one which looks as Kyle (1985)’s
setting. His results depend a lot on the specific assumptions about risk preferences of agents
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and competition. Benos (1998) explicitly models investor behavior in financial markets allowing
for traits linked to a notion of imperfect rationality. He studies an extreme form of posterior over
confidence where some risk neutral investors overestimate the precision of their private information.
In addition, Kyle and Wang (1997) and Wang (1997) consider the case of heterogeneous prior
beliefs. The former considers heterogeneous prior beliefs in their study of the survival of irrational
traders in a duopoly context while the later examines the implication of overconfidence for delegated
fund management in both learning and evolutionary game models. Harris and Raviv (1993) and
Wang (1998) use heterogeneous prior beliefs to explain the enormity of volume traded each day.
Specifically, Wang (1998) extends the model of Kyle (1985) by incorporating heterogeneous prior
beliefs. He finds that in equilibrium, the informed trader, facing both asymmetric information
and heterogeneous prior beliefs, smoothes out his trading on asymmetric information gradually
over time, but concentrates his entire trading on heterogeneous beliefs toward the last few periods.
Since under US securities laws insiders associated with a firm must report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission trades they make in the stock of that firm, we try to study the optimal
behaviors of an irrational insider, and address its impact to the market under the mandatory
disclosure requirements in this paper, using the framework of Kyle (1985).
Kyle (1985)’s model has been widely used to analyze financial market microstructure and the
value of information. For example, Holden and Subrahmanyan (1992) and Foster and Viswanathan
(1996) consider a market with multiple the competing insiders, and they show that competition
among insiders accelerates the release of their private information. Back (1992) formalizes and
extends the model by showing the existence of a unique equilibrium beyond the Gaussian-linear
framework. Remarkable, when the asset value has a log-normal distribution, the price process
becomes a geometric Brownian motion as is usually assumed in finance. Holden and Subrahmanyan
(1994) assume the single informed trader is risk-averse. They show that both monopolistic and
competing informed traders choose to exploit rents rapidly, causing market depth to be low in the
initial periods and high in later periods and causing information to be revealed rapidly, unlike in
the case of a risk-neutral monopolist considered by Kyle (1985). Gong and Zhou (2010) improve
the Kyle (1985) model by loosing the assumption of constant pricing rule and give a new framework
to analysis the insider’s behavior.1. Also, Fishman and Hagerty (1992), Luo (2001), Rochet and
Vila (1994), and Jain and Mirman (1999) e.t. have used variance of Kyle’s model to analyze and
to explain real financial phenomena.
We consider a model in which traders face both asymmetric information and heterogeneous
prior beliefs, with the requirement that the insider publicly disclose his stock trades after the fact.
Heterogeneity arises because traders have different distribution assumptions about an informed
trader’s private signal, that is to say traders agree to disagree with the precision of the signal.
1We will consider this problem using the new framework in other papers, and the purpose of this paper is to
analysis the impact of heterogenous prior beliefs and disclosed insider trades to the market using the framework of
Kyle (1985) so as to compare with the modified model
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Using the same description as Wang (1998), a trader is overconfident if his distribution of the
signal is too tight and underconfident if it is too loose.
We give the existence and the uniqueness of the insider’s equilibrium trading strategy in a multi-
period rational expectation framework and give the analysis of the equilibrium. In equilibrium, the
“trade public disclosure” and “heterogeneous prior beliefs” have great effects on the insider’s trading
intensity, the market depth and the effectiveness of the price.
We obtain many new and interesting results on market characteristics and traders’ strategies.
First, under disclosure requirement, the adverse selection decreases when there is an irrational
informed trader participating in the market, and the descending range is positive related to the
degree of heterogeneity. Since the insider trades more aggressive than he should rationally do, he
submits larger orders. The market makers, realizing that the insider is irrational and aggressive
behavior, increase market depth. While market makers decrease the market depth if there is
no public disclosure requirements, even though the insider is irrational. That is to say, “public
disclosure” leads to smaller market depth.
Also, under the disclosure requirement, the irrational insider’s private information is revealed
slowly and linearly, for any degree of his heterogeneity. That is to say, under the public disclosure
requirement, “heterogeneous beliefs” has no effect on the speed of revelation of information. While
“heterogeneous beliefs” has great impacts on the trading behavior of irrational insiders and market
structure. In particular, under the disclosure requirement, the insider dissembles his information
by adding a random component to his trades in every round except the last one. Despite this, our
analysis shows that the information is reflected more rapidly in price with disclosure of insider trades
than without. An interesting finding is that when the insider is overconfident or underconfident, the
trading intensity of the insider, the heterogeneity parameter and the expected profits all fluctuate
greatly during all early auctions. We reveal the relationship between the heterogeneity and the
trade intensity in the presence of information disclosure, which agrees with our intuition in the
financial market. That is to say, if the underconfident insider puts a positive weight on asymmetric
information this period, then he puts a negative weight on heterogeneous prior beliefs this period,
and the case is inverse in the next period. We also show that the co-existence of public disclosure
and heterogeneous prior beliefs leads to large and fluctuated trading volume and the fluctuation is
positively related to the degree of the insider’s heterogeneity.
More importantly, the irrational insider’s profits of some trading rounds may be negative under
the mandatory disclosure requirement. The expected profits fluctuate during all auctions, and the
fluctuation which is positive related to the degree of heterogeneity is small at the early auctions
and becomes larger as the trading goes by. Moreover, even though the irrational insider may get
negative profits in some periods, he trades to make sure the profit of the last period and the whole
trading profit are all positive.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and in Section 3 we
make an analysis and give the two-period equilibrium of the models with and without disclosure of
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insider trades, respectively. In Section 4, we give the unique linear Nash equilibrium in multi-period
framework and give the analysis of the equilibrium. Finally, the appendix contains the proof of
some necessary propositions.
2 The model
We conform to the notation of Kyle (1985). A single risky asset with a terminal value v˜, which
is normally distributed with mean p0 and variance Σ0, is traded in an N -period sequential auction
market among three kinds of risk-neutral traders: a monopolistic informed trader, noise traders
and market makers. The monopolistic informed trader has a unique access to a private signal s˜∗
about v˜. All market makers and the insider agree that the signal s˜∗ is a scalar multiple of the
terminal value v˜, but they disagree concerning the right scale, that is to say, the informed trader
thinks s˜∗ = c1v˜ while the market makers think s˜∗ = c2v˜ , where c1 and c2 are different positive
constants. If we consider a normalized signal s˜ = s˜
∗
c2
, using the same analysis as Wang (1998) we
know that each trader’s heterogeneous prior belief is characterized completely by a parameter K,
where K = c2/c1 is a positive constant. Then the informed trader thinks s˜ = v˜/K while the market
makers think s˜ = v˜. If we consider the market maker’s beliefs (i.e., K = 1) as the benchmark case,
then the informed trader is “overconfident” if K > 1 and “underconfident” if 0 < K < 1. The noise
traders (uninformed liquidity traders) trade randomly; and market makers set prices efficiently in
the semi-strong form sense, conditional on the total quantities traded by the informed trader and
noise traders, but not each of them. We also assume that there is no discount across periods,
i.e., the interest rate is normalized to zero. This market model has some game-theoretic features.
We can view it as a game played by the insider and the market makers: the insider attempts to
hide his private information and make the best use of his information to maximize his profit; the
market makers attempt to learn the private information from the order and set prices as efficiently
as possible in order to rule out the profit opportunities of the insider.
Let x˜n denote the market order submitted by the informed trader at the n-th auction, con-
ditional on his information, and let µ˜n denote the random quantity traded by noise traders at
the n-th auction. We assume that µ˜n is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ
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µ,
n = 1, 2, · · · , N, and µ˜1, µ˜2, · · · , µ˜N , v˜ are mutually independent. So the total trading volume,
denoted by y˜n, is given by y˜n = x˜n + µ˜n. The market makers set price p˜n in semi-strong form
sense based on his information y˜1, y˜2, · · · , y˜n at the n-th auction. Denote by EK [· · · ] and E1[· · · ]
the expectation operators of the informed trader and the market makers, respectively. Then
p˜n = E1[v˜|y˜1, · · · , y˜n], n = 1, 2, · · · , N .
Let p˜in be the profit which accrues to the informed trader from the n-th auction on, i.e., for
n = 1, 2 · · · , N, p˜in =
∑N
k=n(v˜ − p˜k)x˜k. At each auction the informed trader maximizes his total
expected profits of the current and the remaining rounds of trading conditional on his information,
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i.e.,
max
x
EK [p˜in|s˜ = s, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n = pn], for n = 1, 2, · · · , N.
The equilibrium conditions are that the competition between market makers drives their ex-
pected profits to zero conditional on the order flow and the fact that the informed trader selects
the optimal strategy conditional on his correct conjectures and his information at each auction.
Following the convention in the existing literature, an equilibrium is said to be linear if the pricing
rule is an affine function of the order flow. We will give the definition of equilibrium of two-period
and N-period in the following sections, respectively.
3 Analysis
3.1 Two-period model without public disclosure of insider trades
In order to get a benchmark against which to compare an equilibrium for the case where the
insider’s trade in the first period is publicly disclosed on completion of trading in that period, we
first give the two-period equilibrium of the model without public disclosure of insider trades.
The proposition below is based on a special case of Theorem 1 of Wang (1998).
Proposition 3.1. Given no public disclosure of insider trades, for 0 < K < 2,2 a subgame perfect
linear equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium there are constants βn, θn, λn, γn, αn, ωn, φn, δn and
Σn (n = 1, 2) such that
x˜n = βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p˜n−1) + θns˜,
p˜n − p˜n−1 = γnp˜n−1 + λn(x˜n + µ˜n),
Σ1 = V ar1{v˜|x˜1 + µ˜1},
Σ2 = V ar1{v˜|x˜1 + µ˜1, x˜2 + µ˜2},
EK(p˜i1|s˜ = s, p0) = α0(s− p0)2 + ω0p0s+ φ0s2 + δ0,
EK(p˜i2|s˜ = s, p˜1 = p1, p0) = α1(s− p1)2 + ω1p1s+ φ1s2 + δ1.
Given Σ0 and σ
2
µ, the above constants βn, θn, λn, γn, αn, ωn, φn, δn and Σn(n = 1, 2) satisfy:
λ1 =
1
σµ
√
2K(2−K)[2−m(2−K)][1−m(1−K)]Σ0
4−m(2−K)2 , λ2 =
1
2σµ
√
2K(2−K)2[1−m(1−K)]Σ0
4−m(2−K)2 ,
β1 =
[2−m(2−K)2]
λ1[4−m(2−K)2] , β2 =
1
2λ2
, θ1 = −γ1
λ1
, θ2 =
K − 1
λ2
,
γ1 = (1−K)[1−m(2−K)], γ2 = 1−K,
2Just as the analysis in Wang (1998), the inequality condition 0 < K < 2 means that if a rational informed trader
thinks a risky asset is worth 100, then an irrational informed trader’s subjective value cannot be less than 0 or more
than 200 for the equilibrium to exist.
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α0 =
(1 + γ1)
2
4λ1(1− α1λ1) , α1 =
(2−K)2
4λ2
,
ω0 = ω1 +
(2−K)γ1
λ1
, ω1 =
(2−K)(1−K)
λ2
,
φ0 = φ1 − γ1
λ1
, φ1 =
K − 1
λ2
,
δ0 = α1λ
2
1σ
2
µ, δ1 = 0,
Σ1 =
2(2−K)[1−m(1−K)]
4−m(2−K)2 Σ0, Σ2 =
(2−K)2[1−m(1−K)]
4−m(2−K)2 Σ0
the boundary condition is α2 = ω2 = φ2 = δ2 = 0, and the second order condition is λn(1−αnλn) >
0, (n = 1, 2), where m
.
= λ1
λ2
, and m is the unique solution of the following equation
(2−K)3m3 − 4(2 −K)m2 − 4(2 −K)m+ 8 = 0.
satisfying 0 < m < 22−K .
Proof. See Appendix.
3.2 Two-period model with public disclosure of insider trades
Using the same method by Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001), we know that no invertible
trading strategy can be part of an equilibrium in this case, and we show that there exists an
equilibrium in which the insider’s first-period trade consists of an information-based linear com-
ponent β1(1 + γ1)(s˜ − p˜0) + θ1s˜ and a noise component z˜1, which is independently of v˜ and µ˜1
and normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2z1 . For market makers, the public disclo-
sure of x1 allows them to update their beliefs based on the first period order flow. In particu-
lar, let p˜∗1 = p0 + γ
′
1p0 + η1x˜1 be the expected value of v˜ given x˜1 = x1 and y˜1 = y1. Thus,
E1(v˜|x˜1 = x1, y˜1 = y1) = E1(v|x˜1 = x1). In turn, p˜∗1 replaces p˜1 in the second period price
p˜2 = p˜
∗
1 + γ2p˜
∗
1 + λ2y˜2 = p˜
∗
1 + γ2p˜
∗
1 + λ2(x˜2 + µ˜2).
Applying the principal of backward induction, we can write the insider’s second period optimiza-
tion problem for given x˜1 = x1 and p˜
∗
1 = p
∗
1 as x2 ∈ argmaxxEK [x(v˜− p˜2)|x˜1 = x1, p˜∗1 = p∗1, s˜ = s].
Since
max
x
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜2)|x˜1 = x1, p˜∗1 = p∗1, s˜ = s] = maxx [(Ks− p
∗
1 − γ2p∗1 − λ2x)x], (3.1)
the first order condition implies
x2 = β2(1 + γ2)(s− p∗1) + θ2s =
1 + γ2
2λ2
(s− p∗1) +
K − 1− γ2
2λ2
s, (3.2)
and the second order condition is λ2 > 0. So
EK [p˜i2(p˜
∗
1, s˜)|x˜1 = x1, p˜∗1 = p∗1, s˜ = s] =
1
4λ2
[Ks− (1 + γ2)p∗1]2, (3.3)
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and
β2 =
1
2λ2
, θ2 =
K − 1− γ2
2λ2
. (3.4)
Substituting the above into p˜2 = p˜
∗
1+γ2p˜
∗
1+λ2y˜2 = p˜
∗
1+γ2p˜
∗
1+λ2(x˜2+µ˜2), and using E(p˜
∗
2−p˜∗1) = 0,
we obtain
γ2 = 1−K. (3.5)
Stepping back to the insider’s first period optimization problem, we have
x1 ∈ argmax
x
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜1) + pi2(p˜∗1, s˜)|s˜ = s],
and
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜1) + p˜i2(p˜∗1, s˜)|s˜ = s] = x[Ks− p0 − γ1p0 − λ1x] +
1
4λ2
[Ks− (1 + γ2)(p0 + γ′1p0 + η1x)]2.
(3.6)
The first order condition implies(
η21(1 + γ2)
2
2λ2
− 2λ1
)
x1 +
(
K − η1(1 + γ2)K
2λ2
)
s
−
[
(1 + γ1)− η1(1 + γ2)
2(1 + γ′1)
2λ2
]
p0 = 0.
(3.7)
If our proposed mixed trading strategy x˜1 = β1(1+γ1)(s˜−p˜0)+θ1s˜+z˜1 is to hold in the equilibrium,
we can seek values of λ1, λ2, and γ1 from Eq. (3.7) such that λ1 > 0, λ2 > 0, and
η21(1 + γ2)
2
2λ2
− 2λ1 = 0, (3.8)
K − η1(1 + γ2)K
2λ2
= 0, (3.9)
(1 + γ1)− η1(1 + γ2)
2(1 + γ′1)
2λ2
= 0. (3.10)
Combining Eqs. (3.8), (3.9) with (3.10), we get
λ1 = λ2 =
η1(1 + γ2)
2
.
By the market’s efficient condition, we have
p˜1 = E1(v˜|x˜1 + µ˜1) = p0 + γ1p0 + λ1(x˜1 + µ˜1), p˜∗1 = E1(v˜|x˜1, y˜1) = p0 + γ′1p0 + η1x˜1, (3.11)
where
λ1 =
[β1(1 + γ1) + θ1]Σ0
[β1(1 + γ1) + θ1]2Σ0 + σ2µ + σ
2
z1
, (3.12)
η1 =
[β1(1 + γ1) + θ1]Σ0
[β1(1 + γ1) + θ1]2Σ0 + σ2z1
, (3.13)
γ1 = −λ1θ1, γ′1 = −η1θ1. (3.14)
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Note that
p˜2 − p˜∗1 = γ2p˜∗1 + λ2y˜2 = γ2p˜∗1 + λ2(x˜2 + µ˜2)
and
p˜2 − p˜∗1 = E1(v˜ − p˜∗1|x˜2 + µ˜2, p˜∗1),
by the projection theorem, we know that p˜2− p˜∗1 is the projection of v˜− p˜∗1 onto the two dimension
space spanned by (x˜2+µ˜2, p˜
∗
1) in which λ2 is the coefficient of the 2ed orthogonal basis
γ2
λ2
p˜∗1+x˜2+µ˜2.
Thus, we obtain
p˜2 − p˜∗1 =E1(v˜ − p˜∗1|x˜2 + µ˜2, p˜∗1) = E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗1|
γ2
λ2
p˜∗1 + x˜2 + µ˜2
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗1|(
1 + γ2
2λ2
− γ2
λ2
)(s˜− p∗1) + µ˜2
]
.
(3.15)
Furthermore,
λ2 =
1−γ2
2λ2
Σ1
(1−γ2)2
4λ2
2
Σ1 + σ2µ
, γ2 = 1−K. (3.16)
Then it is easy to get
λ2 =
1
2σµ
√
(2−K)KΣ1, (3.17)
where K must satisfy 0 < K < 2.
Next, we consider the effectiveness of the price, measured by Σn(n = 1, 2). Note that
Σ1 = V ar(v˜|p˜∗1) = V ar(v˜|x˜1) = Σ0 − η21 [(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)2Σ0 + σ2z1 ]. (3.18)
Using λ1 = λ2 =
η1(2−K)
2 , we obtain
(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)Σ0
(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)2Σ0 + σ2z1 + σ
2
µ
=
2−K
2
(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)Σ0
(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)2Σ0 + σ2z1
, (3.19)
i.e.,
K[(β1(1 + γ1) + θ1)
2Σ0 + σ
2
z1
+ σ2µ] = 2σ
2
µ. (3.20)
By Eq. (3.10) we get
(1− λ1θ1)− (1− η1θ1)(2 −K) = 0,
i.e.,
θ1 =
1−K
λ1
.
Then Eq.(3.12) can be rewritten as
λ1 =
Kβ1(1 + γ1)Σ0 +
K(1−K)
λ1
Σ0
2σ2µ
, (3.21)
and thus
β1(1 + γ1) =
2σ2µλ1
KΣ0
− (1−K)
λ1
. (3.22)
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Eqs. (3.17), (3.18) and (3.20) yield
Σ1 = Σ0 − 4λ
2
2
K(2−K)σ
2
µ = Σ0 − Σ1, (3.23)
i.e.,
Σ1 =
1
2
Σ0.
From the above we give the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. For 0 < K < 2 , there exist a unique linear equilibrium in the two-period setting
with public disclosure of the irrational insider’s trades, in which there are constants βn, θn, λn, γn (n =
1, 2), γ′1, η1 and Σ1 such that:
x˜1 = β1(1 + γ1)(s˜− p˜0) + θ1s˜+ z˜1, x˜2 = β2(1 + γ2)(s˜ − p˜∗1) + θ2s˜,
p˜1 − p0 = γ1p0 + λ1(x˜1 + µ˜1), p˜∗1 − p0 = γ′1p0 + η1x˜1,
p˜2 − p˜∗1 = γ2p˜∗1 + λ2(x˜2 + µ˜2), Σ1 = V ar1{v˜|x˜1}.
Given Σ0 and σ
2
µ, the constants βn, θn, λn, γn (n = 1, 2), γ
′
1, η1 and Σ1 are characterized as follows:
λ1 = λ2 =
√
K(2−K)Σ0
2
√
2σµ
,
η1 =
√
KΣ0
σµ
√
2(2 −K) ,
γ1 = K − 1, γ′1 =
2(K − 1)
2−K , γ2 = 1−K,
β1 =
(3K − 2)σµ
K
√
2K(2−K)Σ0
, β2 = σµ
√
2
(2−K)KΣ0 ;
θ1 =
2
√
2(1−K)σµ√
K(2−K)Σ0
, θ2 = −θ1;
E(p˜i1) =
K2√
2K(2−K)σµ
√
Σ0 +
6K2 − 10K + 4√
2K(2 −K)
σµ√
Σ0
p20, ,
E(p˜i2) =
5K2 − 8K + 4
2
√
2K(2 −K)σµ
√
Σ0 +
(2K − 2)2√
2K(2−K)
σµ√
Σ0
p20, ,
Σ1 =
1
2
Σ0,
σ2z1 =
2−K
2K
σ2µ.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Analysis of the equilibrium: The parameters βn and θn measure the intensity of trading
due to asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs, respectively. In Proposition 3.2,
we can have β1
β2
= 3K−22K < 1, which implies the intensity of trading on asymmetric information at
the first period is lower than that at the second period (β1 < β2), no matter what the insider’s
heterogeneous prior belief is. These are consistent with the absence of a concern for the effect
of trading on future expected profits in the last period. It also implies that when the insider is
underconfident (0 < K < 1), he puts a positive weight on heterogeneous prior beliefs in the first
period and negative weight in the second period, i.e., θ1 > 0 and θ2 = −θ1 < 0. While the insider is
overconfident, he does the opposite, that is to say, he puts a negative weight on heterogeneous prior
beliefs in the first period and positive weight in the second period, i.e., θ1 < 0 and θ2 = −θ1 > 0.
These are consistent with our intuition.
The parameters λn, γn and γ
′
n characterize the pricing rule. The liquidity parameter λn is an
inverse measure of market depth and the heterogeneous parameter γn measures the correction in
the efficient price change per unit of the price in the previous period due to heterogeneous prior
beliefs. The parameter γ′n measures the adjusted correction. From the proposition above, we know
that the market liquidity are the same across the two periods, i.e. λ1 = λ2, no matter what the
degree of the heterogenous belief is. η1 − λ1 = K
√
KΣ0
2σµ
√
2(2−K) equals the price adjustment based on
the first period order flow and it increasing with K.
The measure of the informativeness of price, Σ1, equals
Σ0
2 . That is to say, at the end of the
first trading period, a half of the private information has been incorporated into the price. Setting
σ2z1 =
2−K
2K σ
2
µ serves to disguise the information based component of the insider’s trades once they
are publicly disclosed. It is easy to see that σ2z1 is a decreasing function of the parameter K, That
is to say the more confident of the insider the less noise he puts in formulating his strategy.
It is worth noting that the insider’s expected profit at each period is not always positive as
the existence literatures. The sign of the expected profit depends on the degree of heterogeneity.
For example, the insider’s first period expected profit is E(p˜i1) − E(p˜i2) = −3K2+8K−4
2
√
2K(2−K) σµ
√
Σ0 +
2K2−2K√
2K(2−K)
σµ√
Σ0
p20, and when 0 < K <
2
3 , E(p˜i1)− E(p˜i2) < 0.
The same exogenous parameters imply different values for the endogenous parameters depending
not only on whether the insider must disclose his trader after the fact or not but also on the
degree of heterogeneity. In order to distinguish these parameters, we add an upper bar to the
endogenous parameters in the case of Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model and a hat to the
endogenous parameters in the case of Wang (1998). Note that when K = 1 the above proposition
is just Proposition 2 of Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001). The next proposition compares the
endogenous parameters across Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001)’s model and our model when
K 6= 1.
Proposition 3.3. In the two-period setting, the endogenous parameters across Huddart, Hughes
and Levine (2001)’s model and our model satisfy:
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(i) when 0 < K < 1,
β1(1 + γ1) + θ1 > β¯1, β2(1 + γ2) + θ2 < β¯2,
when 1 < K < 2,
β1(1 + γ1) + θ1 < β¯1, β2(1 + γ2) + θ2 > β¯2;
(ii) for all 0 < K < 2,K 6= 1,
λ1 = λ2 < λ¯1 = λ¯2;
(iii) for all 0 < K < 2,K 6= 1,
Σ1 = Σ¯1 =
Σ0
2
;
(iv) when 0 < K < 23 , E(pi1) is bigger or smaller than
σµ
√
Σ0√
2
(the total profit of two period
in the Huddart, et al. (2001)’s model) depends on the value of p0. Especially, when
2
3 < K < 1,
E(pi1) <
σµ
√
Σ0√
2
, and when 1 < K < 2, E(pi1) >
σµ
√
Σ0√
2
.
(v) When 0 < K < 1, σ2z1 > σ¯
2
z1
, and when 1 < K < 2, σ2z1 < σ¯
2
z1
.
Proof. : See the Appendix.
In our model, βi(1 + γi) + θi (i = 1, 2) characterize the degree of the dependence of the private
information, from the Proposition 3.3 we know that under the requirement of trade disclosure, the
underconfident insider’s first period trading intensity is bigger than the rational case, while the
overconfident insider’s is smaller than the rational case. “Trade disclosure” makes the overconfi-
dent trader trade less aggressively than the underconfident trader in the first period. But in the
second period, the trading intensity of the overconfident insider is bigger than the rational and the
underconfident trader’s trading intensity. Not surprisingly, when the insider is irrational, whatever
overconfident or underconfident, the “depth” of the market, i.e. the order flow necessary to induce
prices to rise or fall by one dollar, is bigger than that of Huddart, et al. (2001)’s.
The measure of the informativeness of price Σ1 equals
Σ0
2 . This means that in the two-period
model “the public disclosure” and “heterogeneous prior beliefs” have no effect on the informative-
ness of the price, but it is not true when the trading period is bigger than two, which will be
discussed in Section 4.
In order to disguise his trading, the insider puts a noise in formulating his strategy whose
variance is 2−K2K σ
2
µ. From (v) in Proposition 3.3, we know that when the insider is underconfident
the variance of the noise on his trading strategy is bigger than the rational trader, and when he
is overconfident the variance of the noise on his trading strategy is smaller than the rational case.
This coincides with our intuition.
The following proposition compares the endogenous parameters across the case of our model
and Wang (1998)’s model. For convenience, we only analysis the cases of K = 0.5 and K = 1.5,
respectively.
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Proposition 3.4. In the two-period setting, the endogenous parameters across the case of our
model and Wang (1998)’s model satisfy:
(i) When K = 0.5,
λ1 = λ2 < λˆ1 < λˆ2, β1 < βˆ1 < 0, β2 > βˆ2 > 0, Σ1 < Σˆ1,
γ1 < γˆ1 < 0, γ2 = γˆ2, θ1 > θˆ1 > 0, θ2 < θˆ2 < 0,
E(pi1 − pi2) < 0 < E(pˆi1 − pˆi2), E(pi2) > E(pˆi2),
(ii) When K = 1.5,
λ1 = λ2 < λˆ2 < λˆ1, β1 > βˆ1 > 0, β2 > βˆ2 > 0, Σ1 < Σˆ1,
γ1 > 0 > γˆ1, γ2 = γˆ2, θ1 < 0 < θˆ1, θ2 > θˆ2 > 0.
E(pi1 − pi2) is bigger or smaller than E(pˆi1 − pˆi2), depending on the values of p0 and Σ0. So do
E(pi2) and E(pˆi2).
The above proposition implies that “public disclosure requirement” leads to more effectiveness
of price and larger market depth, whenever the insider is overconfident or underconfident. If the
insider is underconfident, he puts a smaller weight on his private information in the first period
and a larger in the second period. However, the overconfident insider puts a larger weights in the
two periods under the disclosure requirement. The proposition also implies even though “public
disclosure requirement” may lead to negative profit in the first period the irrational insider can
benefit from whole insider trading.
From the discussion above we can conclude that “the public disclosure” and “heterogeneous
prior beliefs” have a great influence on the equilibrium.
4 A sequential auction equilibrium
In this section we generalize the model into N -period trading where a number of rounds of
trading with public disclosure take place sequentially. The model is structured such that the
equilibrium price at each auction reflects the information contained in the past and the current
order flow, and the insider maximizes his expected profits in the equilibrium taking into account
his effect on price in both the current auction and the future auction.
4.1 The sequential equilibrium
Now, we represent a proposition which provides a difference equation system to characterize
the equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.1. In the economy with one irrational informed traders , for 0 < K < 2, there exist
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the equilibrium is a recursive equilibrium. In this equilib-
rium there are constants βn, θn, λn, γn, γ
′
n, αn, ηn, ωn, φn, δn and Σn, characterized by the following:
x˜n = βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n, (4.24)
p˜n − p˜∗n−1 = γnp˜∗n−1 + λn(x˜n + µ˜n), (4.25)
p˜∗n − p˜∗n−1 = γ′np˜∗n−1 + ηnx˜n, (4.26)
EK [p˜in+1|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n = p∗n, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n = pn, s˜ = s]
= αn(s− p∗n)2 + ωnsp∗n + φns2 + δn,
(4.27)
Σn = V ar1{v˜|p˜∗1, · · · , p˜∗n, p˜1, · · · , p˜n}. (4.28)
Given Σ0 and σ
2
µ, βn, θn, λn, γn, γ
′
n, αn, ηn, ωn, φn, δn and Σn (n = 1, · · · , N − 1) are the unique
solution to the difference equation system
αn−1 = [1 + γn − λnβn(1 + γn)]βn(1 + γn) + αn(1 + γ′n − ηnβn(1 + γn))2, (4.29)
ωn−1 =βn(1 + γn)(1−K)− (1 + γn − λnβn(1 + γn))θn + ωn[1− (ηnβn(1 + γn)− γ′n)], (4.30)
φn−1 = φn + βn(1 + γn)(K − 1) + [K + γn − λnβn(1 + γn)]θn + ωn[ηnβn(1 + γn)− γ′n], (4.31)
δn−1 = δn, (4.32)
λn =
K2αn
(2αn − ωn)2 , (4.33)
ηn =
K
2αn − ωn , (4.34)
θn =
2αnK − 2αn + ωn
(2αn − ωn)λn , (4.35)
βn(1 + γn) + θn =
(2αn − ωn)σ2µλn
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)Σn−1 , (4.36)
γn = −λnθn, γ′n = −ηnθn, (4.37)
σ2zn =
Kαnσ
2
µ
2αn −Kαn − ωn −
(2αn − ωn)2σ4µλ2n
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)2Σn−1 ,
(4.38)
Σn = Σn−1 − Kλn
2αn −Kαn − ωnσ
2
µ, (4.39)
for all auction n = 1, · · · , N − 1, and
δN−1 = 0, αN−1 =
(2−K)2
4λN
, ωN−1 =
(2−K)(1−K)
λN
, φN−1 =
K − 1
λN
, (4.40)
βN =
1
2λN
, λN =
√
K(2−K)ΣN−1
2σµ
, θN =
K − 1
λN
, γN = 1−K, (4.41)
αN = ωN = φN = δN = 0.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
As in Wang (1998), the inequality condition for the belief parameter K, i.e., 0 < K < 2, is
required in the above proposition. It results from the fact that the second order condition, which
is given by Eq. (5.74), should be satisfied.
We will give the analysis of the equilibrium described by the proposition above in the following.
4.2 Equilibrium volume
Given the equilibrium of our model, we now investigate how “public disclosure” and “hetero-
geneous prior beliefs” affect the behavior of the trading volume.
Following Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the total trading volume at the n th auction denoted
by V oln, is defined by
V oln =
1
2
(|x˜n|+ |y˜n|+ |µ˜n|). (4.42)
Using the expressions of x˜n, y˜n and µ˜n in Proposition 4.1, we can get the total expected trading
volume as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2. Both “public disclosure” and “heterogeneous prior beliefs” lead to a larger trading
volume and the expected trading volume at the nth (i = 1, 2, · · · , N.) auction is
E1[V oln] =
1√
2pi
(V in + V
l
n + V
m
n ). (4.43)
where
V in =
√
var1(x˜n) =√[
(2αn − ωn)σ2µλn
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)Σn−1
]2
Σn−1 +
[
2αnK − 2αn + ωn
(2αn − ωn)λn
]2
(Σ0 + p20 − Σn−1) + σ2zn ,
(4.44)
V mn =
√
var1(y˜n)
=
√[
(2αn − ωn)σ2µλn
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)Σn−1
]2
Σn−1 +
[
2αnK − 2αn + ωn
(2αn − ωn)λn
]2
(Σ0 + p20 − Σn−1) + σ2zn + σ2µ.
(4.45)
V ln =
√
var1(µ˜n) = σµ (4.46)
for n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1. And
V iN =
√
var1(x˜N ) =
√
Kσ2µ
(2−K) +
4(K − 1)2σ2µ
K(2−K)ΣN−1 (Σ0 + p
2
0 − ΣN−1), (4.47)
V mN =
√
var1(y˜N ) =
√
Kσ2µ
(2−K) +
4(K − 1)2σ2µ
K(2−K)ΣN−1 (Σ0 + p
2
0 − ΣN−1) + σ2µ. (4.48)
V lN =
√
var1(µ˜N ) = σµ, (4.49)
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4.2 gives the contribution of each group of traders to the total trading volume. From
the proof of the proposition 4.1, we know that ωn = 0 when K = 1. Then the term
2αnK−2αn+ωn
(2αn−ωn)λn
in equation (4.45) and (4.44) vanishes when K = 1. That is to say both the insider and the market
makers trade a larger volume under heterogeneous prior beliefs and thus lead to an increase in
total trading volume. Furthermore, σ2zn in equation (4.45) and (4.44) vanishes if there is no public
disclosure requirement, i.e., ‘public disclosure’ also makes both the insider and the market makers
trade a larger volume and thus lead to an increase in total trading volume.
4.3 Properties of the sequential equilibrium
In order to analyze the properties of the equilibrium, we develop an algorithm that analytically
solve the model’s unique equilibrium,3 as described in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Let λn = an
√
Σn−1
σµ
, αn = bn
σµ√
Σn−1
, ωn = cn
σµ√
Σn−1
, ∀n = 1, 2, · · ·N. For
0 < K < 2, the solution of the difference equation system in Proposition 4.1 is given by starting
the boundary condition bN = 0, cN = 0, aN =
√
K(2−K)
2 , and iterating backward for aN−1, · · · , a1,
bN−1, · · · , b1 and cN−1, · · · , c1 by using the following equation, for n = 1, 2 · · · , N − 1,
bn−1 = qn
{
1 +
K3qn
[(2−K)qn − zn](2qn − zn)2
} 1
2
, (4.50)
cn−1 = zn
[
1 +
K3qn
[(2−K)qn − zn][2qn − zn)2
] 1
2
, (4.51)
an =
K2bn
(2bn − cn)2 , (4.52)
where
qn =
[
1− K
4b2n
[(2−K)bn − cn](2bn − cn)3
]
K4b2n − (2bnK − 2bn + cn)(2bn −Kbn − cn)(2bn − cn)2
K2bn(2bn − cn)(2bn −Kbn − cn)
+ bn
[
1− K
3bn
[(2−K)bn − cn](2bn − cn)3
]2
,
(4.53)
zn =
K2bn(1−K)
(2bn − cn)(2bn −Kbn − cn) −
[
2−K − K
4b2n
[(2−K)bn − cn](2bn − cn)3
]
(2bnK − 2bn + cn)(2bn − cn)
K2bn
+ cn
[
1− K
3bn
[(2 −K)bn − cn](2bn − cn)2
]
.
(4.54)
Then starting from the exogenous values Σ0 and σ
2
µ, iterate forward for each of the following
variables in the order listed
3The algorithm here is different form that of Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992).
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Σn =
(
1− Kan
2bn −Kbn − cn
)
Σn−1, (4.55)
βn =
K4b2n − (2bnK − 2bn + cn)(2bn −Kbn − cn)(2bn − cn)2
2K2bn(2bn −Kbn − cn)2
σµ√
Σn−1
, (4.56)
ηn =
K
2bn − cn
√
Σn−1
σµ
, (4.57)
θn =
2bnK − 2bn + cn
an(2bn − cn)
σµ√
Σn−1
, (4.58)
γn = −2bnK − 2bn + cn
2bn − cn ,
(4.59)
γ′n = −
2bnK − 2bn + cn
Kbn
, (4.60)
σ2zn =
Kbn
2bn −Kbn − cnσ
2
µ −
K4b2n
(2bn −Kbn − cn)2(2bn − cn)2σ
2
µ, (4.61)
for all n = 1, 2, · · · , N, and when n = N , the boundary condition is given by Eqs. (4.40) and (4.41).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using formulas in the proposition we generate a series of numerical simulations. We first
compare the interesting parameters λn, Σn, E1[∆p˜in] and σ
2
zn in our model with those of Huddart,
Hughes and Levine (2001) and Wang (1998). As in Kyle (1985), the parameters Σn and λn are the
inverse measures of price efficiency and the market depth, respectively. ∆p˜in denotes the profits of
the n-th auction, i.e., ∆p˜in = p˜in+1− p˜in. And σ2zn denotes the variance of the noise that the insider
put when he plays mixed strategy in the n-th period.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot the dynamic behavior of the liquidity parameter λn and the error
variance of price Σn, respectively, by holding constants N = 20, Σ0 = 1 and σ
2
µ = 1 fixed and
varying the belief parameter K = 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, or 1.8. Among them, the subfigures 1(a) and
2(a) plot the parameters λn and Σn in our model respectively for different values K, while the
subfigures 1(b) and 2(b) contrast the parameters λn and Σn, respectively, (i) when the insider must
disclose each trade ex-post and (ii) when no such disclosures are made.
Figure 1(a) shows the trajectory of the market maker’s price adjustment λn in our model for
varying belief parameters. It indicates that the liquidity parameter λn is constant for any values of
K. This result is consistent with that of Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001). It also indicates that
the market depth, measured by 1
λn
, is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity, measured
by |K − 1|. Figure 1(b) indicates that “public disclosure” not only leads to constant market depth
for any values of K, but also makes the adverse selection (measured by λn) higher than the case of
without public disclosure requirements. This is because under the requirements of disclosure the
information content of the order flow is high.
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(a) Liquidity parameters, λn, when the insider must dis-
closure each trade ex-post, are plotted over time for dif-
ferent values of K, K = 0.5, K = 0.8, K = 1.0, K = 1.2,
K = 1.8.
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(b) The liquidity parameter at each auction is plotted
for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1.0, K = 1.2.
K(without) in the figure means the K in the model
that no public disclosure of insider trade is required,
andK(with) means theK in the model that the insider
must disclose each trade ex post.
Figure 1: Numeric solutions of the liquidity parameters λn with one unit of initial variance of information.
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(a) The Error variances of price, Σn, when the insider
must disclosure each trade ex post, are plotted over time
for different values of K, K = 0.5, K = 0.8, K = 1.0,
K = 1.2, K = 1.8.
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(b) The error variance of price at each auction is plotted
for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1, K = 1.2.
K(without) in the figure means the K in the model
that no public disclosure of insider trade is required,
and K(with) means the K in the model that the insider
must disclose each trade ex-post.
Figure 2: Numeric solutions of the error variance of price, Σn, with one unit of initial variance of information.
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(a) Expected profit, E(∆p˜in), when the insider must dis-
closure each trade ex-post, are plotted over time for dif-
ferent values of K, K = 0.5, K = 0.8, K = 1.0, K = 1.2,
K = 1.8.
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(b) Expected profit E(∆p˜in) at each auction is plotted
for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1, K = 1.2.
K(without) in the figure means the K in the model
that no public disclosure of insider trade is required.
Figure 3: Numeric solutions of the expected profit E(∆p˜in) with one unit of initial variance of information.
The pattern of λn is consistent with the released speed of the information of the insider, mea-
sured by Σn, which is plotted in Figure 2. Figure 2(a) indicates that when the insider must disclose,
the value of Σn following each disclosure declines linearly over time independent of periods and
the values of K. However, Figure 2(b) indicates that less information asymmetry is present in
the market with more aggressive informed trading, measured by the parameter K, without public
disclosure requirements.
In order to see the differences between the heterogeneous priors case to the common priors case,
and the cases with and without public disclosure requirements clearly, we plot the dynamic behavior
of E1[∆p˜in] of the two cases, respectively, in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) shows that the expected profits
of the rational insider are constant over trading rounds. This is the result of Huddart, Hughes and
Levine (2001). An interesting result can be get from Figure 3(a) is that the insider’s profits fluctuate
greatly if the insider is underconfident or overconfident. Specifically, the sign of the expected profit
is alternating to ensure the last sign of the last period is not negative. Moreover, the dynamic
pattern in Figure 3(a) indicates that the fluctuation of the expected profits is positively related to
the degree of heterogeneity, measured by |K − 1|. Even though “disclosure requirement” makes
the profits of some trading rounds are negative, the insider trading can also profit from the whole
trading process. While without the public disclosure of insider trades, the expected profit at each
period is almost constant in all early auctions and becomes significant only in the last few ones.
Figure 4 indicates that the fluctuation of the noise’s variance is bigger at the beginning few
periods and becomes smaller gradually if the the insider is irrational. The degree of noise variance’s
fluctuation is positively related to the degree of heterogeneity, measured by |K − 1|. Figure 4 also
indicates that more overconfident insider puts an smaller noise at the first period and then put a
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Figure 4: The variances of the noise that the insider play, σ2
zn
, are plotted over time for different values of
K, K = 0.5, K = 1.0, K = 1.2, K = 1.5, K = 1.8.
bigger one, while the more under confident insider does the opposite.
Next, we compare parameters βn, θn, γn γ
′
n and V oln between the case of with and without
disclosure of insider trades for varying numbers of trading rounds, by holding constants N = 20,
Σ0 = 1 and σ
2
µ = 1 fixed and varying the belief parameter K = 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, or 1.8. As in Wang
(1998), βn measures the trading intensity on the asymmetric information, θn measures the trading
intensity on heterogeneous beliefs, γn and γ
′
n are heterogeneity parameters, and V oln measures the
total expected trading volume.
Figure 5(a) indicates that under the disclosure requirement the irrational informed trader’s
intensity of trading on asymmetric information, measured by βn, fluctuates greatly during all early
auctions and becomes subdued gradually in the last few rounds of trades. The fluctuation is
also positively related to the degree of the heterogeneity. This result is intuitive since the more
heterogeneous informed trader is the more he will be influenced by the “trade disclosure” and more
aggressively he will trade. Figure 5(a) also indicates if the insider is overconfident the intensity
of trading is positive at the first period and negative at the second period, and the sigh changes
alternatively, while the underconfident insider does the opposite. This result is very differently
from the case of no disclosure requirement, which is given in Figure 5(b).
Figure 6(a) shows that the irrational informed trader’s intensity of trading on heterogeneous
prior beliefs, measured by θn, also fluctuates greatly during all early auctions and the fluctuation is
also positively related to the degree of heterogeneity, but the direction of fluctuation is opposite to
that of βn. That is to say if the irrational insider puts a positive weight on asymmetric information
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(a) The intensities of trading on private information,
measured by βn, are plotted over time for different values
of K, when the insider must disclosure each trade ex-
post.
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Trading Intensity  over Time for Different Values of K
 
 
K(without)=0.5
K(without)=1.0
K(without)=1.2
(b) The intensity of trading on private information at
each auction is plotted for different value ofK, K = 0.5,
K = 1, K = 1.2. K(without) in the figure means theK
in the model that no public disclosure of insider trade
is required.
Figure 5: The intensity of trading on information, βn, over time for different values of K are plotted.
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Trading Intensity Parameter over Time for Different Values of K
 
 
K=0.5
K=0.8
K=1.0
K=1.2
K=1.8
(a) The intensities of trading on heterogeneous prior be-
liefs, measured by θn, are plotted over time for different
values of K, when the insider must disclosure each trade
ex-post. The number of auctions is fixed at N = 20 and
the error variance at each auction is plotted for differ-
ent value of K, K = 0.5, K = 0.8, K = 1.0, K = 1.2,
K = 1.8.
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Trading Intensity Parameter over Time for Different Values of K
 
 
K(without)=0.5
K(without)=1.0
K(without)=1.2
(b) The intensities of trading on heterogeneous prior
beliefs at each auction are plotted for different value of
K, K = 0.5, K = 1, K = 1.2. K(without) in the figure
means the K in the model that no public disclosure of
insider trade is required.
Figure 6: The intensity of trading on heterogeneous prior beliefs, θn, over time for different values of K are
plotted.
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K=0.5
K=0.8
K=1.0
K=1.2
K=1.8
(a) The heterogeneity parameters, γn,are plotted over
time for different values of K, when the insider must
disclosure each trade ex post. The number of auctions
is fixed at N = 20 and the error variance at each auction
is plotted for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 0.8,
K = 1.0, K = 1.2, K = 1.8.
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K(without)=0.5
K(without)=1
K(without)=1.2
(b) The heterogeneity parameter, γn, at each auction
is plotted for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1,
K = 1.2. K(without) in the figure means the K in
the model that no public disclosure of insider trade is
required.
Figure 7: The intensity of trading on heterogeneous prior beliefs, θn, over time for different values of K are
plotted.
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K=0.5
K=0.8
K=1.0
K=1.2
K=1.8
Figure 8: The heterogeneous parameters, γ′
n
, over time for different values of K are plotted, when the
insider must disclosure each trade ex post. The number of auctions is fixed at N = 20 and the liquidity
parameter at each auction is plotted for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1.0, K = 1.2, K = 1.5, K = 1.8.
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K=0.5
K=0.8
K=1.0
K=1.2
K=1.8
(a) The expected total trading volume, V oln, over time
for different values of K are plotted, when the insider
must disclosure each trade ex post. The number of auc-
tions is fixed at N = 20 and the liquidity parameter at
each auction is plotted for different value of K, K = 0.5,
K = 0.8, K = 1.0, K = 1.2, K = 1.8.
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K(without)=0.5
K(without)=1
K(without)=1.2
(b) The expected total trading volume at each auction
is plotted for different value of K, K = 0.5, K = 1.0,
K = 1.2. K(without) in the figure means the K in
the model that no public disclosure of insider trade is
required.
Figure 9: Numeric solutions of the expected total trading volume V oln with one unit of initial variance of
information.
this period, then he puts a negative weight on heterogeneous prior beliefs, and the case is inverse in
the next period. While Figure 6(b) shows that the informed trader trades on differences in beliefs
only in the last few auctions since the intensity of trading on heterogeneous prior beliefs is negligible
in all early auctions, which is the result of Wang (1998). Comparing the Figure 5(a) with Figure
5(b), and 6(a) with Figure 6(a) we know that ‘trade disclosure’ has a big influence on the insider’s
strategy, whenever the insider is underconfident or overconfident.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 plot the heterogeneity parameters γn and γ
′
n, respectively. They indicate
that γn and γ
′
n all also fluctuate according to the degree of heterogeneity. This pattern is consistent
with the informed trader’s strategies. Market makers can correctly predict that “heterogeneous
prior beliefs” and “trade disclosure” have big impacts on the trader’s strategies at each auction,
market makers choose a non-zero γn to account for the adverse selection problem properly, and
adjust γn to γ
′
n correctly after observing the insider’s trading. This intuition is further confirmed
by the fact that the patterns in Figure 7(a) and Figure 8 are exactly the opposites of the pattern
in Figure 6(a).
Figure 9(a) indicates that the total expected trading volume V oln, is positively related to the
degree of heterogeneity, measured by |K − 1|. The fluctuation is greatly during all early auctions
and becomes subdued gradually in the last few rounds of trades, this pattern is consistent with
that of the trading strategy of the insider. Comparing Figure 9(a) with Figure 9(b), we how that
under the requirement of public disclosure, the expected trading volume is dramatically big. This
result vividly confirms Proposition 4.2 which shows that not only “heterogeneous prior beliefs” but
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also “public disclosure” lead to a larger volume.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have characterized the dynamically optimal trading strategies of an irrational
insider under ex-post disclosure requirement, and addressed the impacts on the financial markets.
In contrast to the case of an irrational insider who restricts his intensity of trading on private
information, during all early auctions and becomes aggressive only in the last few rounds of trades
in a setting under no disclosure requirement, we show that the irrational insider under disclosure
requirement employs a mixed strategy and trades more aggressive on private information from
the beginning to the end. In particular, under disclosure requirements, insider puts the weights
on asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs are opposite in sign, and the sighs
change alternatively in the next period. Since on one hand the irrational insider is overconfident or
underconfident about his signal and on the other hand he wants to dissimulates his information, he
trades more aggressively than he rational does. The market makers, realizing the heterogeneity and
that a part of total order flow is due to aggressive behavior, increases market depth. Also, under
disclosure requirement, the market depth is positive related to the degree of the heterogeneity.
Our model indicates that despite the irrational insider dissembles his information by adding
a random component to his trades, the information is reflected more rapidly in price with the
disclosure of insider trades than without. An interesting find is that “public disclosure” makes
the revelation speed of the information are the same, whenever the insider is overconfident or
underconfident. In equilibrium, we also show that while “public disclosure” may lead to negative
profits at some trading rounds, insider trading remains profitable from the whole trading time.
The irrational insider trades to make sure his profit at the last period is positive. Furthermore, the
heterogeneity beliefs and public disclosure all lead to larger trading volume. The co-existence of
the heterogeneity beliefs and public disclosure makes the trading volume fluctuate greatly, and the
fluctuation is positive related to the degree of the insider’s heterogeneity. This result can explain
the trading fluctuation in the real finance in some sense.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: Let the N in Theorem 1 of Wang (1998) equal 2 and ∆tn equal 1
(n = 1, 2), we have the following relationships:
α2 = ω2 = φ2 = δ2 = 0, β2 =
1
2λ2
, θ2 = −γ2
λ2
,
λ2 =
[(1 + γ2)β2 + θ2]Σ2
σ2µ
, γ2 = 1−K, Σ2 = (1 + γ2)(1− λ2β2)Σ1,
α1 =
(1 + γ2)
2
4λ2
, ω1 =
(2−K)γ2
λ2
, φ1 = −γ2
λ2
, δ1 = 0,
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β1 =
1− 2α1λ1
2λ1(1− α1λ1) , θ1 = −
γ1
λ1
, λ1 =
[(1 + γ1)β1 + θ1]Σ1
σ2µ
,
γ1 = 1−K − ω1λ1, Σ1 = (1 + γ1)(1 − λ1β1)Σ0,
α0 =
(1 + γ1)
2
4λ1(1− α1λ1) , ω0 = ω1 +
(2−K)γ1
λ1
, φ0 = φ1 − γ1
λ1
, δ0 = α1λ
2
1σ
2
µ.
By γ2 = 1−K we can get
β2 =
1
2λ2
, θ2 =
K − 1
λ2
, λ22 =
KΣ2
2σ2µ
, Σ2 = (1− K
2
)Σ1,
α1 =
(2−K)2
4λ2
, ω1 =
(2−K)(1−K)
λ2
, φ1 =
K − 1
λ2
.
From the second order condition, λ2 > 0, we can get λ2 =
√
KΣ2
2σ2µ
. From the above we know that if
we get Σ2, then we can get λ2, and all the coefficients of the second period is known. But in order
to get Σ2, we first solve Σ1. Combing the expression of α1 and β1, we get
β1 =
[2−m(2−K)2]
λ1[4−m(2−K)2] . (5.62)
The expression of γ1 and ω1 imply
γ1 = (1−K)[1−m(2−K)], θ1 = −γ1
λ1
, Σ1 =
2(2−K)[1−m(1−K)]Σ0
4−m(2−K)2 . (5.63)
where m
.
= λ1
λ2
.
Substitute the expression of β1, γ1, θ1 and Σ1 into λ1 =
[(1+γ1)β1+θ1]Σ1
σ2µ
, we obtain
λ21 =
1
σ2µ
2K(2−K)[2−m(2−K)][1 −m(1−K)]Σ0
[4−m(2−K)2]2 .
When 4−m(2−K)2 > 0, [2−m(2−K)][1−m(1−K)] > 0, i.e. 0 < m < 22−K
λ1 =
1
σµ
√
2K(2−K)[2−m(2−K)][1−m(1−K)]Σ0
4−m(2−K)2 .
By the expression of Σ1, we get
Σ2 =
2−K
2
Σ1 =
(2−K)2[1−m(1−K)]
4−m(2−K)2 Σ0,
λ2 =
√
KΣ2
2σ2µ
=
1
2σµ
√
2K(2−K)2[1−m(1−K)]Σ0
4−m(2−K)2 .
Since m
.
= λ1
λ2
, we have
m = 2
√
2−m(2−K)
(2−K)[4−m(2−K)2]
i.e.
(2−K)3m3 − 4(2 −K)m2 − 4(2 −K)m+ 8 = 0,
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andm satisfy 0 < m < 22−K ,m <
4
(2−K)2 . From 0 < K < 2 we get 0 < m <
2
2−K . In order to explain
the root that satisfy the condition is unique, let f(m) = (2−K)3m3−4(2−K)m2−4(2−K)m+8.
It is easy to know f(0) = 8 > 0, f( 22−K ) = − 8K2−K < 0, so the needed root is unique. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: In order to get the proposition, we only need to compute E1(p˜i1)
and E1(p˜i2).
Using Eq. (3.3), we can get
E1(p˜i2) =E1{EK [p˜i2(p˜∗1, s˜)|x˜1, p˜∗1, s˜]} = E1
{
1
4λ2
[Ks˜− (1 + γ2)p˜∗1]2
}
=
1
4λ2
{
K2Σ1 + (2K − 2)2E1[(1 + γ′1)p0 + η1x˜1]2
}
=
K2Σ1
4λ2
+
(2K − 2)2
4λ2
[η21(β1 + θ1)
2Σ0 + (η1θ1 +
K
2−K )
2p20 + η
2
1σ
2
z1
].
(5.64)
Substitute the expression of η1, β1, θ1 and σ
2
z1
into the above equation, yields
E1(p˜i2) =
K
√
KΣ0σµ
2
√
2(2−K) +
(2K − 2)2σµ√
2K(2−K)Σ0
×
 KΣ02(2−K)σ2µ
σ2µ
Σ0
2−K
2K
Σ0 +
[ √
KΣ0
σµ
√
2(2 −K)
2
√
2(1−K)σµ√
K(2−K)Σ0
+
K
2−K
]2
p20 +
KΣ0
2(2−K)σ2µ
2−K
2K
σ2µ


=
5K2 − 8K + 4
2
√
2K(2−K)σµ
√
Σ0 +
(2K − 2)2√
2K(2−K)Σ0
σµp
2
0.
(5.65)
Eq. (3.6) implies
E1(p˜i1) =E1{EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜1) + p˜i2(p˜∗1, s˜)|s˜]}
=E1{[β1(s˜− p0) + θ1s˜+ z˜1][Ks˜− p0 − γ1p0 − λ1β1(s˜ − p0)− λ1θ1s˜− λ1z˜1]}+ E1(p˜i2),
(5.66)
while
E1{[β1(s˜− p0) + θ1s˜+ z˜1][Ks˜− p0 − γ1p0 − λ1β1(s˜− p0)− λ1θ1s˜− λ1z˜1]}
=(K − λ1β1 − λ1θ1)(β1 + θ1)(Σ0 + p20) + (β1 + θ1)(λ1β1 − 1− γ1)p20 − β1(K − λ1β1 − λ1θ1)p20
− β1(λ1β1 − 1− γ1)p20 − λ1σ2z1
=
3K − 2
2
√
2−K
2K
√
Σ0σµ + (K − 1)
√
2K
2−K
σµ√
Σ0
p20.
(5.67)
Eqs. (5.66) and (5.67) imply
E1(p˜i1) =
2K2
2
√
2K(2−K)
√
Σ0σµ +
6K2 − 10K + 4√
2K(2 −K)
σµ√
Σ0
p20. (5.68)
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3: From Proposition 3.2, it is easy to get
β1(1 + γ1) + θ1 =
σµ√
Σ0
√
2−K
2K
, β2(1 + γ2) + θ2 =
K
2λ2
=
√
2Kσµ√
(2−K)Σ0
,
λ1 = λ2 =
√
K(2−K)Σ0
2
√
2σµ
, Σ1 =
Σ0
2
, σ2z1 =
2−K
2K
σ2µ,
and the total expected profit is
E1(p˜i1) =
2K2
2
√
2K(2−K)
√
Σ0σµ +
6K2 − 10K + 4√
2K(2 −K)
σµ√
Σ0
p20.
By Proposition 2 in Huddart, et al.(2001), we get
β¯1 =
σµ√
2Σ0
, β¯2 = σµ
√
2
Σ0
, λ¯1 = λ¯2 =
1
2σµ
√
Σ0
2
,
Σ¯1 =
Σ0
2
, σ¯2z1 =
1
2
σ2µ,
and the total expected profit is
σµ
√
Σ0√
2
.
Comparing the corresponding parameters respectively, it is easy to get the conclusion.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.4: (i) By taking K = 0.5 in Proposition 3.1, we can have m = 0.9235,
and
λˆ1 ≈ 0.3665
√
Σ0
σµ
, λˆ2 ≈ 0.3969
√
Σ0
σµ
, βˆ1 ≈ −0.1105 σµ√
Σ0
, βˆ2 ≈ 1.2598 σµ√
Σ0
, γˆ1 ≈ −0.1926,
γˆ2 =
1
2
, θˆ1 ≈ 0.5255 σµ√
Σ0
, θˆ2 ≈ −1.2598 σµ√
Σ0
, Σˆ1 ≈ 0.8401Σ0, Σˆ2 ≈ 0.6301Σ0,
E(pˆi1) ≈ 0.3814σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.3670
σµ√
Σ0
p20,
E(pˆi2) ≈ 0.2329σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.6298
σµ√
Σ0
p20.
And taking K = 0.5 in Proposition 3.2, we get
λ1 = λ2 ≈ 0.3062
√
Σ0
σµ
, η1 ≈ 0.4082
√
Σ0
σµ
, γ1 = −γ2 = −0.5, β1 ≈ −0.8165 σµ√
Σ0
, β2 ≈ 1.6330 σµ√
Σ0
,
θ1 = −θ2 ≈ 1.6330 σµ√
Σ0
, Σ1 =
1
2
Σ0,
E(p˜i1) ≈ 0.2041σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.4082
σµ√
Σ0
p20,
E(p˜i2) ≈ 0.5103σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.8165
σµ√
Σ0
p20.
(ii) By taking K = 1.5 in Proposition 3.1, we can have m = 1.6257 and
λˆ1 ≈ 0.5000
√
Σ0
σµ
, λˆ2 ≈ 0.3076
√
Σ0
σµ
, βˆ1 ≈ 0.8869 σµ√
Σ0
, βˆ2 ≈ 1.6255 σµ√
Σ0
, γˆ1 ≈ −0.0936,
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γˆ2 = −1
2
, θˆ1 ≈ 0.1872 σµ√
Σ0
, θˆ2 ≈ 1.6255 σµ√
Σ0
, Σˆ1 ≈ 0.5045Σ0, Σˆ2 ≈ 0.1261Σ0,
E(pˆi1) ≈ 2.3207σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.9064
σµ√
Σ0
p20,
E(pˆi2) ≈ 1.3253σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.8128
σµ√
Σ0
p20
And taking K = 1.5 in Proposition 3.2, we get
λ1 = λ2 ≈ 0.3062
√
Σ0
σµ
, η1 ≈ 1.2247
√
Σ0
σµ
, γ1 = −γ2 = 0.5, β1 ≈ 1.3608 σµ√
Σ0
, β2 ≈ 1.6330 σµ√
Σ0
,
θ1 = −θ2 ≈ −1.6330 σµ√
Σ0
, Σ1 =
1
2
Σ0,
E(p˜i1) ≈ 1.8371σµ
√
Σ0 + 2.0412
σµ√
Σ0
p20,
E(p˜i2) ≈ 1.3268σµ
√
Σ0 + 0.8165
σµ√
Σ0
p20.
Comparing the corresponding parameters respectively, it is easy to get the conclusion.Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.1: ForN(N ≥ 2), suppose that there exist constants βn, θn, γn, λn, γ′n, ηn
such that
x˜n = βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n,
p˜n − p˜∗n−1 = γnp˜∗n−1 + λn(x˜n + µ˜n),
p˜∗n − p˜∗n−1 = γ′np˜∗n−1 + ηnx˜n.
We will use the backward induction method to prove that the unique linear equilibrium exists.
Suppose that there exist constants αn, ωn, φn and δn such that
EK [p˜in+1|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n = p∗n, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n = pn, s˜ = s]
= αn(s− p∗n)2 + ωnsp∗n + φns2 + δn.
Applying the principal of backward induction, we can write the insider’s last period (Nth
period) optimization problem for given x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, p˜∗1 =
p∗1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, s˜ = s as
xN ∈ argmax
x
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜N )|x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1,
p˜∗1 = p
∗
1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, s˜ = s],
where
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜N )|x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, s˜ = s]
=EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜∗N−1 − γN p˜∗N−1 − λN (x˜+ µ˜N ))|x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1,
p˜∗1 = p
∗
1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, s˜ = s]
=x[Ks− p∗N−1 − γNp∗N−1 − λNx].
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The first order condition implies
xN =
1 + γN
2λN
(s− p∗N−1) +
1
2λN
(K − 1− γN )s, (5.69)
and the second order condition is λN > 0.
From Eq. (5.69), we know that
βN =
1
2λN
, θN =
1
2λN
(K − 1− γN ), (5.70)
and
EK [x˜N (v˜ − p˜N )|x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1,
p˜∗1 = p
∗
1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, s˜ = s]
=
[
1 + γN
2λN
(s − p∗N−1) +
1
2λN
(K − 1− γN )s
]
×[
Ks− p∗N−1 − γNp∗N−1 −
1 + γN
2
(s− p∗N−1)−
1
2
(K − 1− γN )s
]
=
1
4λN
[
(1 + γN )(s − p∗N−1) + (K − 1− γN )s
]2
=
1
4λN
[
(1 + γN )
2(s− p∗N−1)2 − 2(1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )sp∗N−1 + (K + 1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )s2
]
,
(5.71)
so
αN−1 =
(1 + γN )
2
4λN
, ωN−1 =
−2(1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )
4λN
, φN−1 =
(K + 1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )
4λN
.
(5.72)
Since γN = −λNθN , γ′N = −ηNθN , by the market efficient condition, we have
p˜N − p˜∗N−1 =E1(v˜ − p˜∗N−1|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜N−1 = pN−1,
x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, y˜N = yN )
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|x˜N + µ˜N +
γN
λN
p∗N−1
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗N−1|
γN
λN
p˜∗N−1 + βN (1 + γN )(s˜ − p∗N−1) + θN s˜+ µ˜N
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗N−1|(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )(s˜ − p˜∗N−1) + µ˜N
]
,
(5.73)
so
λN =
(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )ΣN−1
(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )2ΣN−1 + σ2µ
.
Substitute Eq. (5.70) into the above expression, we have
λN =
K
2λN
ΣN−1
K2
4λ2
N
ΣN−1 + σ2µ
, (5.74)
and combing the above with the second order condition, we get
λN =
√
K(2−K)ΣN−1
4σ2µ
. (5.75)
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So the K should satisfied 0 < K < 2. Eq. (5.70) and γN = −λNθN imply
θN =
K − 1
λN
, γN = 1−K.
Substitute the above to Eq. (5.72), we have
αN−1 =
(1 + γN )
2
4λN
=
(2−K)2
4λN
, (5.76)
ωN−1 =
−2(1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )
4λN
=
(2−K)(1−K)
λN
, (5.77)
φN−1 =
(K + 1 + γN )(K − 1− γN )
4λN
=
K − 1
λN
. (5.78)
Since
ΣN =V ar1(v˜|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗N−1 = p∗N−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜N−1 = pN−1,
x˜1 = x1, · · · , x˜N−1 = xN−1, x˜N = xN )
=V ar1
[
v˜ − p∗N−1|x˜N +
γN
λN
p∗N−1
]
=V ar1
[
v˜ − p∗N−1|
γN
λN
p∗N−1 + βN (1 + γN )(s˜− p∗N−1) + θN s˜
]
=V ar1
[
v˜ − p˜∗N−1|(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )(s˜ − p˜∗N−1)
]
,
(5.79)
we have
ΣN = ΣN−1 −
(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )
2Σ2N−1
(βN (1 + γN ) + θN )2ΣN−1
= 0.
Since p˜in = p˜in+1 + x˜n(v˜ − p˜n) we have
EK [p˜in|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, s˜ = s]
=max
x
EK [x˜(v˜ − p˜n)||p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, s˜ = s]
+ EK [αn(s˜− p˜∗n)2 + ωnsp˜∗n + φns˜2 + δn|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1,
p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, s˜ = s]
=max
x
{x[Ks− (1 + γn)p∗n−1 − λnx] + αn[s − p∗n−1 − γ′np∗n−1 − ηnx]2+
ωns(p
∗
n−1 + γ
′
np
∗
n−1 + ηnx) + φns
2 + δn},
(5.80)
The first order condition is
(2λn − 2αnη2n)xn − (K − 2αnηn + ηnωn)(s − p∗n−1)
+ [1 + γn − 2αnηn(1 + γ′n)−K + 2αnηn − ηnωn]p∗n−1 = 0.
(5.81)
In the rational sense, s˜− p˜∗n−1 is independent with p˜∗n−1. If our suppose mixed strategy hold, then
we have
2λn − 2αnη2n = 0, (5.82)
K − 2αnηn + ηnωn = 0, (5.83)
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1 + γn − 2αnηn(1 + γ′n) = 0. (5.84)
Since p˜n − p˜∗n−1 = γnp˜∗n−1+ λn(x˜n + µ˜n), p˜∗n − p˜∗n−1 = γ′np˜∗n−1 + ηnx˜n and E(p˜n) = E(p˜∗n), we have
γn = −λnθn, γ′n = −ηnθn. (5.85)
Combing the market efficient condition with Eq. (5.85), we have
p˜n − p˜∗n−1 =E1(v˜ − p˜∗n−1|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, x˜1 + µ˜1, · · · , x˜n + µ˜n)
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|x˜n + µ˜n +
γn
λn
p˜∗n−1
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|
γn
λn
p˜∗n−1 + βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p˜∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n + µ˜n
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|(βn(1 + γn) + θn)(s˜− p˜∗n−1) + z˜n + µ˜n
]
,
(5.86)
and
p˜∗n − p˜∗n−1 =E1(v˜ − p˜∗n−1|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, x˜1, · · · , x˜n))
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|x˜n +
γ′n
ηn
p∗n−1
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|
γ′n
ηn
p∗n−1 + βn(1 + γn)(s˜− p∗n−1) + θns˜+ zn
]
=E1
[
v˜ − p˜∗n−1|(βn(1 + γn) + θn)(s˜− p˜∗n−1) + z˜n
]
,
(5.87)
so
λn =
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)Σn−1
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)2Σn−1 + σ2µ + σ2zn
, (5.88)
ηn =
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)Σn−1
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)2Σn−1 + σ2zn
. (5.89)
Combing Eqs. (5.82) and (5.83)
ηn =
K
2αn − ωn , λn =
K2αn
(2αn − ωn)2 ,
Eqs. (5.82), (5.88) and (5.89) yield
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)Σn−1
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)2Σn−1 + σ2zn + σ
2
µ
=
Kαn
2αn − ωn
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)Σn−1
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)2Σn−1 + σ2zn
, (5.90)
i.e.
(βn(1 + γn) + θn)
2Σn−1 + σ2zn =
Kαn
2αn −Kαn − ωnσ
2
µ. (5.91)
Substitute the above formula into the Eq. (5.88), it is easy to get
βn(1 + γn) + θn =
(2αn − ωn)σ2µλn
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)Σn−1 , (5.92)
and
σ2zn =
Kαnσ
2
µ
2αn −Kαn − ωn −
(2αn − ωn)2σ4µλ2n
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)2Σn−1 .
(5.93)
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Since θn =
2αnηn−1
λn
= 2αnK−2αn+ωn(2αn−ωn)λn , we have
βn(1 + γn) =
K4α2nσ
2
µ
(2αn −Kαn − ωn)(2αn − ω − n)3Σn−1λn −
2αnK − 2αn + ωn
(2αn − ωn)λn . (5.94)
Using Eqs. (5.94) and the projection theorem for normally distributed random variables, we obtain
Σn = Σn−1 − Kλn
2αn −Kαn − ωnσ
2
µ. (5.95)
Since the strategy of the insider is x˜n = βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p˜∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n, we have
EK{p˜in|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, s˜ = s}
=EK{[βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p˜∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n][v˜ − p˜∗n−1 − γnp˜∗n−1 − βn(1 + γn)λn(s˜− p˜∗n−1)− λnθns˜− λnz˜n − λnµ˜n]
+ αn[s˜− p˜∗n−1 − γ′np˜∗n−1 − βn(1 + γn)ηn(s˜− p˜∗n−1)− ηnθns˜− ηnz˜n]2
+ ωns˜[p˜
∗
n−1 + γ
′
np˜
∗
n−1 + βn(1 + γn)ηn(s˜− p˜∗n−1) + ηnθns˜+ ηnz˜n] + φns˜2 + δn
|p˜∗1 = p∗1, · · · , p˜∗n−1 = p∗n−1, p˜1 = p1, · · · , p˜n−1 = pn−1, s˜ = s}
=[(1 + γn − λnβn(1 + γn))βn(1 + γn) + αn(1 + γ′n − ηnβn(1 + γn))2](s− p∗n−1)2+
[βn(1 + γn)(1 −K)− (1 + γn − λnβn(1 + γn))θn + ωn[1− (ηnβn(1 + γn)− γ′n)]]sp∗n−1
+ [φn + βn(1 + γn)(K − 1) + (K + γn − λnβn(1 + γn))θn + ωn(ηnβn(1 + γn)− γ′n)]s2+
αnη
2
nσ
2
zn
+ δn − λnσ2zn ,
(5.96)
thus we obtain that αn−1, ωn−1, φn−1 and δn−1 are given by Eqs. (4.29)− (4.32), respectively.
We have proved that the difference equation system given by Eqs. (4.29)-(4.39) describes a linear
equilibrium of the model, next we prove that this equilibrium is the unique linear equilibrium with
the boundary condition αN = ωN = φN = δN = 0.
Given αn, ωn and Σn, λn and ηn are uniquely determined by Eqs. (4.33) and (4.34). Further-
more, given αn, ωn, φn, δn, Σn and λn, we can obtain βn, θn, γn, γ
′
n, Σn−1, αn−1, ωn−1, φn−1,
δn−1 from Eqs. (4.29)-(4.39). Thus we can iterate the system backwards one step. Given the the
boundary conditionαN = ωN = φN = δN = 0, the backward iteration procedure yields a family
of solutions to the difference equation system parameterized by the terminal value ΣN . But ΣN
is proportional to Σ0 in any solution and consequently there is a unique solution given the initial
value Σ0.
Proof of Proposition 4.2 Note that x˜n,y˜n, and µ˜n are normally distributed with zero mean,
we have
E1[V oln] =
1
2
(E1[|x˜n|] + E1[|y˜n|] + E1[|µ˜n|])
=
1√
2pi
(
√
var1(x˜n) +
√
var1(µ˜n) +
√
var1(y˜n))
=
1√
2pi
(V in + V
l
n + V
m
n ),
. (5.97)
where V in =
√
var1(x˜n), V
m
n =
√
var1(y˜n), and V
l
n =
√
var1(µ˜n).
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We only need to calculate var1[y˜n] and var1[y˜N ], and the rests are similar and easy. By defini-
tion, and Eq. (4.24)
y˜n = x˜n + µ˜n = βn(1 + γn)(s˜ − p∗n−1) + θns˜+ z˜n + µ˜n, (5.98)
for n = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, and
y˜N = x˜N + µ˜N = βN (1 + γN )(s˜− p∗N−1) + θN s˜+ µ˜N . (5.99)
Taking variance on both sides of Eqs. (5.98) and (5.99), respectively, we obtain
var1[y˜n] = [βn(1 + γn) + θn]
2Σn−1 + θ2n(Σ0 + p
2
0 − Σn−1) + σ2zn + σ2µ, (5.100)
var1[y˜N ] = (βN (1 + γN ) + θN )
2ΣN−1 + θ2N (Σ0 + p
2
0 − ΣN−1) + σ2µ. (5.101)
Applying Eqs. (4.35) and (4.36) into Eq.(5.100) yields Eq. (4.45), and applying Eq. (4.39) into
Eq. (5.101) yields Eq. (4.50).
Proof of Proposition 4.3 Since ∀n = 1, 2, · · ·N,
λn = an
√
Σn−1
σµ
, αn = bn
σµ√
Σn−1
, ωn = cn
σµ√
Σn−1
. (5.102)
The boundary conditions Eqs. (4.40) and (4.41) imply bN = 0, cN = 0, aN =
√
K(2−K)
2 . Substitute
Eq. (5.102) into Eqs. (4.39), (4.36), (4.34), (4.35), (4.37) and (4.38) respectively, we can get Eqs.
(4.55)-(4.61). And Eq. (4.33) implies Eq. (4.52). Using Eq. (4.29) we can obtain
bn−1
(
1− Kan−1
2bn−1 −Kbn−1 − cn−1
) 1
2
= qn, (5.103)
where qn is given by (4.53). And using (4.30), we can have
bn−1
(
1− Kan−1
2bn−1 −Kbn−1 − cn−1
)1
2
= zn, (5.104)
where zn is given by (4.54). Using Eqs. (5.103) and (5.104), we can get (4.50) and (4.51).
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